Abstract
The near blanket rejection of the possibility of moral behavior in animals, however, is not driven by an empirical examination of particular cases but by conceptual considerations. The moral motivations are precisely things that make normative claims on their subjects. Good motivations should be embraced, and evil ones should be resisted. Suppose one decides – as many theories of moral development suggest – that Jon Venables and Robert Thompson were below the age at which they could be regarded as morally responsible. And if the human is a moral subject, then the sentimentalist will have to take seriously the idea that some animals are too. The blanket dismissal of the possibility of moral behavior in animals has no justification. The category of the moral subject has languished unrecognized because it is almost universally thought to collapse into that of moral agent. Rescinding from moral evaluation of individuals is one thing; rescinding from moral evaluation of their motivations is quite another.