Abstract
A brief recounting of the complex social capacities I have discussed so far suggests that Aristotle likely had it right in the Politics when he famously said that “man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals” (1253a 8–9). We see this political readiness in many ways. Humans are strongly interested in others’ faces and emotions from the first hours of life, and we are deeply oriented toward attachment to other humans. We are “imitation machines,” replicating actions necessary to achieve an outcome but also actions we perceive as intentionally normative. We come to recognize ourselves as separate independent agents, but this appears to be secondary to our ability to see others as independent actors with their own beliefs, emotions, and intentions. We are able to pursue independent goals, but we also pursue joint goals with shared intentionality. We are prolific, highly engaged cooperators. We punish cheaters without direct benefit to us as punishers, only a group benefit that the punisher shares. Cooperation can be directed toward individual benefit, but cooperative activities are also choiceworthy in themselves. We can self-reflect, but we do so frequently in terms of the norms and expectations of our group. Language deepens and enriches all of these activities.