Abstract
In this work I develop a model of attention inspired in classic bottleneck theories and load theories of attention. I call this model “Information Gating”. The proposal is based on empirical and conceptual considerations, and it is intended to give a response to two kind of worries in contemporary theorizing about attention, namely, worries about the existence of an essence of attention, and worries about the possibility of identifying a sub-personal basis for such an essence. In the first part of the dissertation (Chapters 1-3) I motivate and articulate the Information Gating model, compare it to alternative proposals, and defend it from initial objections. Two main ideas are central to this part. First, attention can be neuro-functionally conceptualized as informational enhancement. Second, attention works as a general modulator of the flow of information within a cognitive system. Then, in the second part of this work (Chapter 4) I show how the model contributes to our understanding of some key aspects of phenomenal consciousness. This discussion is mostly focused on the relation between attention and the contents of consciousness. A central goal in this part consists in identifying the forms of attention that are necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness, and proposing a plausible explanation for this.