Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to offer an account of metaphysical grounding based on property theory. In Chapter 1, I explain the motivation behind the project. In Chapter 2, I propose a property theory, and argue that true real definition statements show property constitution. In Chapter 3, I relate true grounding claims with true factive real definition statements. This suggests that defining metaphysical grounding in terms of property constitution and property instantiation might be promising. To carry out the project, I define the notion of determinant assignment on the basis of the property theory proposed in Chapter 2. Then, I offer an account of metaphysical grounding by appealing to the notion of determinant assignment and its factualization. Since these two notions can be defined in terms of property constitution and property instantiation, metaphysical grounding can also be defined in terms of property constitution and property instantiation. With my account of metaphysical grounding, in Chapter 4, I argue that metaphysical grounding is a strict order, and that both the entailment principle and the internality principle are false. Finally, I address the meta-grounding problem.