Yin-Yang In Epistemology

In this dissertation, I propose a novel model to analyze the process of inquiry and deliberation in terms of an updated concept of yin-yang in Chinese philosophy. This yin-yang model shows that it is the dynamic process to be assessed rather than static attitudes, especially in cases of akratic beliefs and suspension. In the second chapter, I introduce the updated concept of yin-yang, tracing its philosophical roots and explaining how it can account for process rationality. Drawing on examples like Galileo’s observation of the Moon, it delineates the diachronic progression of belief concatenation. In the third chapter, I argue that akratic beliefs should be taken as transitional episodes of an inquiry or inference in progress. This account shifts focus from evaluating temporary belief states to assessing the deliberative process. In the fourth chapter, I analyze epistemic suspension through the yin-yang framework, presenting it as a dynamic process of receptivity to information and decisiveness in judgment. This reinterpretation underscores its role in fostering inquiry and resolving epistemic uncertainty. By framing inquiry and deliberation as a continuous, dynamic process, the new model for understanding complex epistemic phenomena bridges traditional Chinese philosophy and contemporary epistemology.