Privilege, Knowledge, and Obligations: A Discussion on Epistemic Responsibility

This thesis seeks to put forth that, within the framework of epistemic injustice, individuals with privilege are capable of imposing self-directed epistemic disadvantages. Their inherited stances and lack of adequate reflection repeatedly hinder their knowledge practices as agents, interpreters, and educators. Since they lack the relevant experiences of toil that prompt questions about self and the world, I also argue that they bear the responsibility of an imperfect duty to object to their own ignorance. I will advocate that the amelioration of these poor habits comes by way of cultivating the epistemic virtues of intellectual humility, open-mindedness, and curiosity. As potential motivators, I propose both interpersonal obligations and obligations to the self. Through their privilege and failure to realize their epistemic potential, they have become disconnected from a full sense of self and deprive the world from what it stands to benefit from their reaching such a state.