Abstract
The Daubert case suggests 4 factors that courts might use in assessing reliability: 1. falsifiability, 2. the known or potential error rate, 3. peer review and publication, and 4. acceptance in the relevant community. In partial dissent, however, pointing out that the word "reliable" nowhere occurs in the text of Rule 702, Justice Rehnquist anticipated difficulties over whether and if so how Daubert should be applied to non-scientific expert testimony. In Kumho, the Supreme Court made a real epistemological step forward. In this products-liability case, focused on the proffered testimony of an expert on tire failure, the court tried to sort out the problems with non-scientific experts and ruled that judges cannot evade their gatekeeping duty on the grounds that proffered expert testimony is not science. The problem that judges generally lack the background knowledge which may be essential to a serious appraisal of the worth of scientific testimony is not merely unresolved, but more acute than ever.