Optimal Contract Design for a National Brand Manufacturer Under Store Brand Private Information

Journal article

Peer reviewed

Xinyan Cao, Xiang Fang, Guang Xiao and Nan Yang

Manufacturing & service operations management, Vol.25(5), pp.1835-1854

2023-09-01

Abstract

asymmetric information

mechanism design

store brand

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Title: Optimal Contract Design for a National Brand Manufacturer Under Store Brand Private Information
Creators: Xinyan Cao - Northern Illinois University
Xiang Fang - University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
Guang Xiao - Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Nan Yang - University of Miami
Publication Details: Manufacturing & service operations management, Vol.25(5), pp.1835-1854
Number of pages: 20
Grant note: PolyU 15505621 / Research Grants Council, University Grants Committee (http://data.elsevier.com/vocabulary/SciValFunders/501100002920)
Academic Unit: Miami Herbert Business School; MHBS - Management
Language: English
Resource Type: Journal article
Record Identifier: 991032796051502976