Simple Design Mechanisms to Mitigate the Winner's Curse: Simultaneous Online Auctions with Rotating Bids

Journal article

Gordon Burtch and Paul A. Pavlou

SSRN Electronic Journal

2010

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https://lens.org/130-137-561-170-140View

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https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1576310View

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https://autopapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1576310View

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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1576310View

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Title: Simple Design Mechanisms to Mitigate the Winner's Curse: Simultaneous Online Auctions with Rotating Bids
Creators: Gordon Burtch - Boston University
Paul A. Pavlou - University of Houston
Publication Details: SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Academic Unit: Miami Herbert Business School; MHBS - Administration; BTE - Business Technology Department
Resource Type: Journal article
Record Identifier: 991032069207102976