Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, and the Volatile Shareholder Interest

Journal article

Virginia Law & Business Review, Vol.1, p.55

2006

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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1864&context=faculty_scholarshipView

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https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1877&context=fac_articlesView

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https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles/876/View

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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/866/View

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Title: Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, and the Volatile Shareholder Interest
Creators: William W. Bratton
Publication Details: Virginia Law & Business Review, Vol.1, p.55
Academic Unit: School of Law; School of Law
Resource Type: Journal article
Record Identifier: 991031720286402976