Platonism is the view according to which entities such as numbers and properties, characterized as abstract objects, exist. Agust & iacute;n Rayo argues that the truth conditions for statements about mathematical objects and properties make no demands on the world and are, in this way, trivial. The result is trivialist platonism. In this paper, we question the stability of the two central features of the view: it cannot be both trivialist and platonist.
We would like to thank Agustin Rayo for his extremely helpful comments on an earlier version of this work. Thanks also to an anonymous reviewer for valuable feedback. Javier Cumpa declares that this publication is part of the grant RYC2021-032478-I funded by MCIN/AEI 10.13039/501100011033 and by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR, being RYC2021-032478-I the reference of the grant contained in the granting resolution; MCIN the acronym of the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion; AEI the acronym of the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion; 10.13039/501100011033 the DOI (Digital Object Identifier) of the Agencia; and PRTR the acronym of the Plan de Recuperacion, Transformacion y Resiliencia. He also declares that this publication is part of the I + D +i project The Epistemic Value of Metaphysics: Beyond Explanatory and Non-Explanatory Metaphysics (PID2023-147789NB-I00) funded by the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades, by the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (DOI: 10.13039/501100011033) and by the Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional.